In the the recent past some forms of risk sharing agreements have been used in some countries in drug pricing . In this note we present a speci…c risk sharing agreement on e¤ectiveness and show how such mechanism is going to a¤ect the market in the long run. Iparticular, we will show how the regulator may create a trade o¤ between expected e¢ cacy and the number of patients to be treated using the pricing formula.
Introduction
In Europe national authorities have continued to implement a series of measures, both controls (e.g. budget impact limitations for a single drug) and incentives (e.g. prescription limitations to be followed by physicians) to in ‡uence supply of and demand for pharmaceuticals. Although the form of the price regulation may vary, one of the essential elements of the process is that the outcome of the listing process for a drug is uncertain and depends on the e¢ cacy (D), the price (p) and the market of the new drug (x). In other words, the pro…t an industry is expected to obtain from the commercialisation of a new drug can be written as:
where (D; px) is the probability of the new drug of being listed which depends on the e¢ cacy of the drug and on the budget that it will require to be o¤ered to the patients that will bene…t from the drug (px):The probability of being listed is increasing and concave in D(
0): Most system do not foresee penalties if the drug e¤ectiveness falls short of the declared e¢ cacy and/or the volume is greater than what agreed. Only recently some forms of risk sharing agreements have been used in some countries (e.g. UK and Italy), where for some drugs the manufacturer has to rebate the full or the 50% of the treatment in case of failure. A new strand of the literature, starting with the contribution by Zaric and O'Brien (2005) incorporates in the pricing mechanism a speci…c penalty if the quantity sold exceeds the negotiated one. In this note we present a speci…c risk sharing agreement on e¤ectiveness and show how the risk sharing formula a¤ects the de…nition of the price of the drug itself. In particular, we will show how the regulator may use the princing formula and the parameters of the probability of being listed to in ‡uence the market for each drug.
The model
We assume that while the expected e¢ cacy of the drug can be veri…ed by both parties through the results of the randomised clinical trials the industry has to produce to the regulator, its e¤ectiveness is not known when the price is set. Such uncertainty depends on several elements such as the role of compliance, the interactions with other drugs when patients have several pathologies, the appropriateness of physicians' prescription behaviour. The industry has more precise information on the likely e¤ectiveness of the drug because it has access to more information than the minimum required by the regulatory process and it can, to some extent, control the e¤ectiveness of the drug through detailing. However, the regulatory systems often used in western countries do not give enough incentives to the industry to promote an appropriate targeting of the new drugs. In this note we assume that the price of the drug is set according to the e¢ cacy as declared by the industry, but it might be reduced ex post if the e¤ectiveness is lower than expected. The industry is trying to maximise its expected pro…t while the regulator wants to avoid overpaying for drugs having a limited e¤ectiveness. The industry knows better than the regulator the probability distribution of the e¤ectivess owing to its information advantage on the way the e¢ cacy results have been obtained. On the contrary, the regulator has more contractual power because it can set the rules of the game as concerns the parameters of the pricing reimbursement formula.
A new drug is about to be commercialised. Its level of cost e¤ectiveness lies within a range of values (0,A): with a known probability distribution g(E) with G(0) = 0; G(A) = 1:To simplify the exposition, we assume that the distribution of this function is uniform, i.e. g(e) = 1=A:The price for any new drug is de…ned by the following formula:
where : F = …xed costs (mainly research and marketing) the industry has borne and/or is going to incur to commercialise the product. We assume it to be a determined outside the model. D = is the cost e¢ cacy that is declared by the industry for reimbursement purposes and that it will have to lye in the range (0; A) E = is the ex post e¤ectiveness that can be observed by both parties, later in time.
and z are the parameters of the incentive formula.
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The formula is asymmetric since the industry pays a penalty if the ex post e¤ectiveness falls short the declared e¢ cacy, but it will not be rewarded if it happens that the drug is more e¤ective than declared. The reason for this asymmetry mainly depends on the consideration that the industry may have better information than the regulator on the likely e¤ects of the drug hence it has a strong advantage in setting this parameter.
The industry applies for the drug to be reimbursed by the regulator. The latter may decide or not grant reimbursement; such decision depends on the e¤ectiveness of the drug and on the budget B = px that is necessary to take care of the possible bene…ter (x) of the new drug. Both variables are measured in relation to the market in which the new drug is introduced. In particular we assume that the probability of being reimbursed can be de…ned ( This function is common knowledge to the actors in the decision process, i.e. the industry knows the parameters of this function before setting D. Given that during the negotiation process both parties do not know the true e¤ectiveness, the budget that the regulator uses in the decision to list the drug is the expected cost p = c + D: .
The decision by the pharmaceutical …rm
The industry wants to maximise its expected pro…t and to do so it has to choose which level of e¢ cacy that maximises the following function:
The F.O.C can be written as:
The …rst order conditions can be interpreted as follows: for D, the …rm chooses the point where the marginal increase in the pro…t due to a change in the marginal probability of being listed is equal to the expected penalty the …rm will have to pay if D < E. For x the …rm chooses the point where the marginal increase in pro…t is equal to the marginal expected unitary pro…t. These conditions depend on the form of the probability function, on the distribution of the e¤ectiveness parameter and on the reimbursement parameters and z.
In particular, it is interesting to note that if the probability of being listed did not depend on e¢ cacy and the penalty function was symmetric, the industry would have an incentive to play strategically 1 only if z 6 = 1: If instead the probability of being listed depends on D, the …rm may have an incentive in reporting D strategically and the penalty z can be used to reduce the incentive to misreport D. The choice is not so straightforward since the …rm has to take account of the e¤ect D has on the budget and in taking this decision the …rm can control x as well. In in this context z can be used to reduce the incentive to the industry to bee too optimistic on the likely e¤ectiveness of the drug.The optimal solution for D and x can be written as:
The e¢ cacy declared does not depend on the rate at which it is reimbursed ( ), but on other parameters such as the form of the probability of being reimbursed and on the proportion of …xed costs that the regulator is going to reimburse. The quantity for which the industry applies for listing is negatively related with the …ne as one could expect. From a policy point of view it is interesting to note that the quantity is also negatively related with the declared e¢ cacy. The equation presented above aslo show the relationship between price setting of di¤erent products. z has a clear depressing e¤ect on the pro…t since it decreases the price and quantity sold. As for , there e¤ect is not so clearcut since it a¤ects the price, the quantity and the probability of being reimbursed. To show how risk sharing a¤ects the industry's decision, let assume that the price is set by taking into account only the e¢ cacy of the drug. In a long run equilibrium we may think that the price of any drug is set according to its e¢ -cacy 2 . This implies that the price for the old drug is equal to D . The optimal level for D and x can be written as:
This model shows how the e¢ cacy (D ) and the number of potential patients (x ) will normally result in this regulated market. D will be probably quite 1 In this case in fact the derivative of D with respect to pro…t is equal to (1 zE) x 2 For a discussion of such system see Capri and Levaggi (2002; 2006) high (which is in line with the new innovative technologies) unless penalty (z) is very high (which is quite improbable). The number of patients treated may be controlled by the regulator through the listing process. For example, if the latter wants the same number of patients treated with the old and the new drug, it will have to give a double importance to the e¢ cacy compared to the budget 3 . To some extent this may not be a perverse e¤ect of regulation given that the new drugs are more e¤ective, but also more targeted on restricted number of patients (Pirmohamed and Lewis 2004 ).
Conclusion
In this note we have presented a possible risk sharing mechanism based on the e¢ cacy and e¤ectiveness of the new drug. Such formula seems to limit the number of people that will be treated instead of increasing it as the risk sharing mechanism proposes by (NICE 2007; Barros 2007 ). In our analysis we have assumed that the number of patients to be treated is set before the negotiation and any patient in excess of x will not be reimbursed. Given the importance played by x in this model, the mechanism proposed by Zaric and O'Brien (2005) to control patients becomes even more important and the two instruments should be used together.
In actual fact such a system may be di¢ cult to be used because drugs may have di¤erent cost of production and such a system would penalize those that have an higher cost. However we think that this simple relationship may shed some lights on the way regulation rules should be set.Finally, a pricing scheme has to be clearly speci…ed and stable in the short an long term, otherwise it could damage rather than improve a reimbursement system (Claxton et al. 2008 ).
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